The relationship between board characteristics and firm performance of Sri Lankan listed companies by Nazar, M.C.A
Business and Management  
Proceedings, 04th International Symposium, SEUSL 
Page 343 
The Relationship between Board Characteristics and Firm Performance of 
Sri Lankan Listed Companies 
 
M.C.A.Nazar 
 
Department of Accountancy and Finance, South Eastern University of Sri Lanka, University 
Park, 32360, Oluvil. 
 
Corresponding email: mcanazar@seu.ac.lk 
 
Abstract 
 
Many studies carried out to investigate the link between board characteristics and firm performance in 
developed countries. The empirical evidence on this area is very thin in Sri Lanka being a developing country. 
Hence this study was undertaken with the intension of fulfilling the gap. The study examines the impact of 
board characteristics on firm performance of Sri Lankan listed companies. This study employs a cross sectional 
analysis of 116 firms as sample of listed companies in Colombo Stock Exchange for the financial year ending 
2013 and multivariate analyses are used to test the proposed hypotheses. The board characteristics variables 
being the independent variables and firm performance variable being the dependent variable are tested under 
regression model. The results of the study show that board size and CEO duality are significantly negatively 
associated with ROA. The study also documents that board independence is negatively related with ROA and 
director ownership is positively related with ROA but both are not significant. Furthermore, control variables of 
firm size and dividend yield are significantly positively linked with ROA and leverage is negatively related with 
ROA though not significant. The findings of the study indicate mixed results which are in consistent with 
empirical evidence of developed nation. 
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Introduction 
 
Corporate governance has been an important subject of academic research and policy disclosure in countries 
around the world. The increasing importance of corporate governance mechanism comes from a large body of 
empirical and theoretical research which highlights the corporate governance systems matter in the profitability 
and growth of corporation. Governance system influences output and investment decisions of firms through 
several channels which include ownership and control structure, development of financial intermediaries and 
capital markets, corporate financing, investment pattern, investment protection and creditor rights.  
 
A board of directors is a body chosen or appointed members who jointly supervise the activities of a company. 
The board of directors acts as one of the most important governance mechanisms in aligning the interest of 
managers and shareholders. The board is charged with the task of monitoring the performance and activities of 
top management to confirm that the latter acts in the best interests of the owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Based on this view, boards have a potential critical role to play in mitigating agency problems arising from the 
universal separation of firm ownership from control (Fama, 1980; Jensen, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Furthermore, Ruigrok et al, (2006) state that boards also have important roles to play with respect to activities 
such as designing and implementing strategies and fostering links between the firms and its external 
environment. Given their comprehensive tasks therefore, it seems believable that board may positively or 
negatively impact firm performance.  
 
The board is a key element in corporate governance system that monitors and instructs management in carrying 
spotlight for the fraud cases that has resulted in the failure of major corporations, for example, Enron, 
WorldCom and Global Crossing. Some of the reasons stated for those corporate failures are the lack of vigilant 
mistake functions by the board of directors, the board surrendering control to corporate managers who pursue 
their own self-interests and the board being negligent in its accountability to stakeholders. As a result, various 
corporate governance reforms have specially emphasized on appropriate changes to be made to the board of 
directors in terms of its composition, structure and ownership configuration. In Sri Lanka, the newly amended 
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code of best practice on corporate governance 2013 was issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri 
Lanka and Securities and Exchange Commission. The code proposes that the board to have a balance of 
executive and Non-executive directors such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the 
-taking. And also, recommends that the role of the chairman and the CEO should not hold by 
the same person to ensure the balance of power and authority. 
 
Many studies on corporate governance and firm performance were carried out in the developed countries such 
as USA, UK, Japan, Germany and France (Yermack, 1996; Hampel, 1998; Higgs, 2003: Dahya and Mc Connell, 
2003). In addition, some other studies have been done in South East Asian countries, for example, Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Singapore (Abdullah, 2004; Zubaidah et al., 2009; Gazzaly, 2010). Studies relating to the effect 
between board characteristics and firm performances are not conclusive in nature. For example, Dalton et al., 
(1998), Weir and laing (1999), Weir et al., (2002) found slight evidence to recommend that board characteristics 
affect firm performance. Conversely, some studies have found a positive association between certain board 
characteristics and firm performance (Bhagat and Black, 1999; Keil & Nicholson, 2003; Bonn, 2004).  
Despite magnitude of corporate governance around the world, there have been very limited studies pertaining to 
the effect of corporate governance variables such as board characteristics and on firm performance in Sri Lanka 
except the study carried out by Fernando in 2007. In similar perspective, some other researchers have done 
study in relation to the corporate governance practices, ownership structure and firm performances for selected 
sectors in Sri Lanka (Senarathne and Gunaratne, 2007; Kajananthan, 2012). To boom the search light on this 
gap has primarily necessitated this study. 
 
The objective of this study is to examine the impact of the characteristics of board of directors and firm 
performance in listed companies in Sri Lanka. 
 
Literature review and hypotheses development 
 
Non-Executive director and firm performance 
 
Existing work in the analytical agency tradition (e.g., Stiles and Taylor, 2001) suggests that a higher proportion 
of outside directors should be associated with stronger financial performance. Zubaidah et al (2009) found that 
independent non-executive directors contribute significantly in the long term performance of the company. In 
addition, Dehaenc et al (2001) concluded that there was a significant positive relationship between the 
and Creamer (2010) found that there was a positive and significant association between the percentage of non-
executive directors on the board and firm performance. Furthermore, Dahya and McConnell (2005) found the 
same results in the UK firms. The appointment of financial outside directors to a public corporation is associated 
with positive abnormal return among medium size companies (Lee et al, 1999). 
 
On the other hand, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found a significant negative relationship between outside board 
members and firm performance. This result is also supported by Bhagat and Black (1999) with the findings of 
firms having more outside directors performs poorer than other firms. Empirically, research on non-executive 
director in relation to firm performance is inconsistent. Therefore, the hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
 
H1: There is positive relationship between the percentage of independent non-executive director   and firm 
performance.  
 
Board size and firm performance 
 
Agency  theory  suggests  that  a  larger  number  of  directors  in  the  board  are  more  likely  to  be vigilant  
for  agency  problems  because  of  greater  number  of  people  will  be  involving  in management activities in 
an organization. However,  one of the  agency theorists, Jensen  (1993) suggested  that  board  members  limit  
at  around  eight  directors.  Hermalin  and  Weisbach  (1991) concluded  that  board  size  is  negatively  related  
to  firm  performance.  Similarly,  in  a  research conducted  among  small  and  medium  size  companies  in  
Finland  by  Eisenberg,  Sundgren  and Wells (1998), it was  found out  that there was  a significant negative 
correlation between board size and profitability. Furthermore, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) also supported the 
above results through their studies.  Yermack  (1996)  found  a  strong  negative  relationship  between  size  of  
board  and  firm performance as measured by Tobins  Q. He also exhibited those companies having small 
boards have more favorable financial ratios. In similar perspective, Conyon and Peck (1998) cited that there was 
a weak inverse relationship between board size and market based firm performance.  In contrast, Zubaidah et al 
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(2009) found that board size has a positive impact on firm performance with a sample of 75 listed companies in 
Bursa Malaysia. Therefore, the hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between board size and firm performance. 
 
CEO duality and firm performance 
 
One of the important monitoring systems supported by the agency perspective is the separation of the roles of 
CEO from that of a chairman in a firm. When the chairman of a board also plays the role of the CEO, there is 
every likely hood that this may result in what is called role conflict in that particular firm. In contrast, an 
independent chairman is believed to effectively and efficiently monitor and control CEO and other management 
activities to maximize the sharehol
1994). Yermack (1996) highlighted that firm performance was higher when t
positions are held by two different people. In addition, Fosberg and Nelson (1999) found that the firm with 
separated roles between the CEO and the chairman yield a significant development in firm performance. In 
similar view, Fooladi (2012) concluded that CEO duality has inverse association with firm performance (ROE 
and ROA). On the other hand, Dehaene et al. (2001) found that when both roles were combined, there was a 
positive relationship between duality and firm performance. In addition, some other studies concluded that there 
was no significant association between CEO duality and firm performance (Zubaidah et al, 2009; Shukeri et al, 
2012). Therefore, the hypothesis can be formulated as follows:  
 
H3: There is negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance. 
 
Director ownership and firm performance 
 
Management ownership is also an important factor, because it has the tendency to reduce conflict between 
manager and shareholder. If the directors hold the stock in the same company they become owners themselves 
and can direct and control the company management (Jensen and Mackling, 1976). When the board of directors 
to involve in opportunistic behavior (Zubaidah et al., 2009).Therefore, i
ownership has negative association with agency conflict and as a result, a positive association with firm 
performance. Han and Suk (1998) documented that increase in director ownership led to improved corporate 
performance, however, extreme insider ownership caused in poorer corporate performance, suggesting a 
managerial entrenchment outcome. Furthermore, some other studies found that there was no significant linked 
between ownership structure and firm performance (Fooladi, 2012; Zubaidah et al, 2009). Therefore, the 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows:  
 
H4  
 
Data and Research Method 
 
Data and Sample 
The data use in the form of secondary data. The data and information for this study collected from the Colombo 
Stock Exchange (CSE) websites, annual reports, journals and CSE publications. 
The total listed companies in the CSE contained 293 companies in 2013 have been categories under 20 different 
sectors. The sample consists of 116 non-financial public listed companies in Sri Lanka whose annual reports are 
available in 2013. 
 
Research Model 
A cross - sectional ordinary least square regression model used test the developed hypotheses for this study. The 
regression model utilized to test the relationship between the board characteristics and firm performance are as 
follows: 
 
Firm Performance = 1 2 3 4 Director Ownership + 
5 Firm S 6 7 Dividend Yield + ei 
 
Variables and Descriptions 
 
The variables for the study were chosen based on data availability and computational purposes. 
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Firm performance variables 
Return on Asset = Net Income / Total Assets 
 
Board characteristics variables 
Board Size   = Number of directors on the board 
Board Independence = No. of outside directors / Total No.of directors 
CEO Duality = 1= Yes, 0= No 
Director Ownership = No. of ordinary shares owned by directors / Total No. of ordinary shares 
 
Control variables 
Firm size = Natural log of total assets reported on annual report 
Leverage = Total debt / Total equity 
Dividend Yield = Cash dividend paid / Shareholders equity 
 
Data analysis and discussion 
 
Descriptive statistics were carried out to obtain sample characteristics. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for 
the variable of board characteristics used in the study.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 : Descriptive statistics 
  ROA BIND 
BOARD 
SIZ 
CEO 
DUAL 
DR 
OWNE 
FIRM 
SIZE 
LEVE 
RAGE 
DIVID 
YIE 
 Mean 0.062 0.715 7.940 0.138 0.099 9.665 0.367 0.057 
 Median 0.057 0.714 8.000 0.000 0.002 9.694 0.140 0.016 
 Maximum 0.544 1.000 12.000 1.000 3.000 11.202 7.371 2.429 
 Minimum -0.793 0.250 3.000 0.000 0.000 8.056 0.000 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 0.120 0.204 1.966 0.346 0.320 0.618 0.777 0.235 
 Skewness -2.260 -0.245 0.271 2.100 6.837 -0.118 6.678 9.177 
 Kurtosis 26.678 2.246 2.493 5.410 60.069 2.931 58.418 91.815 
                  
 Jarque-Bera 2808.536 3.906 2.657 113.333 16645.050 0.292 15706.160 39753.610 
 Probability 0.000 0.142 0.265 0.000 0.000 0.864 0.000 0.000 
                  
 Sum 7.165 82.897 921.000 16.000 11.526 1121.136 42.593 6.567 
 Sum Sq. 
Dev. 1.650 4.777 444.578 13.793 11.745 43.877 69.514 6.340 
                  
 Observations 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
 
The number of directors on Sri Lankan board is between 3 and 12 with an average board size in the selected 
firms is about 8 persons. This result is reliable with the study by Fooladi (2012) and Zubaidah et al (2009), 
Lipton and Lorsch(1992) and Brown and Caylor (2004).  Seventy one percent (71%) of overall board members 
are non-executive directors. In addition, of all the firms studied, 87% of them adapt the 2 tier board structure 
implying that about 13% of the firms have their CEOs and Board chairman positions combined in one 
personality. This suggests that way for agency problems originating from conflict of interest are minimized. The 
ng is about 10 percent (10%). 
Correlation results 
Table 2 : Correlation matrix 
  ROA  BIND  
BOARD 
SIZ  
CEO 
DUAL  
DR 
OWNE  
FIRM 
SIZE  
LEVE 
RAGE  
DIVID 
YIE  
ROA  1               
BIND  -0.141 1             
BOARDSIZ  -0.116 -0.177** 1           
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CEODUAL  -0.168* -0.105 -0.039 1         
DROWNE  0.032 -0.017 0.021 -0.006 1       
FIRMSIZE  0.229*** -0.277*** 0.307*** -0.009 0.081 1     
LEVERAGE  -0.102 0.084 0.040 -0.024 -0.071 0.184** 1   
DIVIDYIE  0.500*** -0.084 -0.068 -0.030 -0.041 0.105 -0.054 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation results between board characteristics and firm performances. Board independence 
and board size are negatively correlated with ROA but not significant. In addition, CEO duality is significantly 
negatively correlated with ROA at the 10% level. Director ownership is positively correlated with ROA. 
Furthermore, Firm size and dividend yield are significantly positively correlated with ROA. But, leverage is 
negatively linked with ROA.  
Regression results 
 
 
Table 3 shows the regression results of the relationship between board characteristics and ROA. The 
relationship between the number of the independent directors from the board and firm performance is not 
statistically significant; the board composition has a negative relationship with ROA. This is consistent with the 
findings of Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Bhagat and black (1999). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 which stated a 
positive relationship between the percentage of independent non-executive directors and firm performance is 
rejected. The size of the board of directors is significantly negatively associated with ROA. Hence, in line with 
international research in the field (e.g.,Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al, 1998) current study offers some support 
for the view that a negative relation between board size and firm performance is also obvious in the Sri Lankan 
setting. Hence, Hypothesis 2 which established a negative relationship between board size and firm performance 
is accepted. Relating to CEO duality the results of the study shows that there is a strong negative relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance, measured by the ROA. This findings are supported with Yermack 
(1996) and Fosberg and Nelson (1999). Yermack (1996) argues that, firms are more valuable when the CEO and 
board chair positions are separate. Hence, Hypothesis 3 is supported with the regression results in relation to 
ROA and therefore accepted. Based on the regression results, there is a positive relationship between director 
ownership and ROA though not significant. H4 is not support to the findings thus the director ownership does 
not give any effect to the firm performance. This result contradicts with Morck et al, (1988) and Han and Suk 
(1998). Morck et al find evidence that firm performance increases when the director shareholder increases. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.252609 0.169308 -1.492013 0.1386
BIND -0.045822 0.048667 -0.941527 0.3485
BOARDSIZ -0.010536 0.005038 -2.091384 0.0388
CEODUAL -0.058673 0.027098 -2.165181 0.0326
DROWNE 0.009712 0.029382 0.33055 0.7416
FIRMSIZE 0.044606 0.016883 2.642047 0.0095
LEVERAGE -0.016773 0.012387 -1.354105 0.1785
DIVIDYIE 0.228637 0.04037 5.663551 0
R-squared 0.348373     Mean dependent var 0.061764
Adjusted R-squared0.306138     S.D. dependent var 0.1198
S.E. of regression 0.099791     Akaike info criterion -1.705004
Sum squared resid 1.075492     Schwarz criterion -1.515101
Log likelihood 106.8902     Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.627914
F-statistic 8.248437     Durbin-Watson stat 1.552631
Prob(F-statistic) 0
Table 3 : Regression results
Dependent Variable: ROA
Included observations: 116
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In keeping with the literature, the study includes control variables in the regression analysis.  Table 3 indicates 
that leverage has negative impact on firm performance (ROA). On the other hand, both firm size and dividend 
yield are significantly positively interrelated with ROA.  
Conclusions 
 
This study explores the relationship between board characteristics and firm performance for 116 firms as sample 
of listed companies in Colombo Stock Exchange. This research used the ROA as proxy measurer for firm 
performance and four board characte
ownership. The results of the study provide that both board size and CEO duality are significantly negatively 
associated with ROA. As regarding the relationship between the numbers of independent directors and firm 
performance, there resulted no significant association. In addition, there is a positive relationship between 
director ownership and ROA though not significant. In the case of control variables, firm size and dividend yield 
are significantly positively related with ROA and leverage is negatively associated with ROA. The results of the 
study are mostly consistent with the previous studies and it shows the importance of board characteristics should 
be highlighted in order to improve the firm performance. 
 
The major limitations of this study are as follows: First, the study based on the cross sectional study which is 
concern about one year period may not provide more generalized result. Second, this study used only ROA as a 
performance measure can include ROE, ROCE and Tobin Q in order to get generalized results. It is highly 
recommended that future research should be analyzed more than one year because the effect of independent 
variables may be during subsequent periods. And also could be considered on non-financial aspects of 
performance such as customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, and managerial satisfaction. It would also be 
more meaningful to perform a comparative analysis between Sri Lanka and other countries. 
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